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SECTION 116 OF THE AUSTRALIAN 
CONSTITUTION AND DRESS 
RESTRICTIONS 
ANTHONY GRAY*
This article considers constitutional arguments that would arise if a 
government at either federal or state level decided to ban dress often 
identified as having religious connotations. This is not a far-fetched 
scenario, with at least one current Member of Parliament calling for such a 
ban, and bans operating in some overseas jurisdictions. It concludes that 
there would be serious constitutional doubt about such a law. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The question of the extent to which an individual has or should have the right 
to religious freedom, and to manifest that freedom by wearing particular items 
of clothing, is very contentious. Some nations have banned the wearing of 
particular items of clothing thought to have religious significance, at least in 
some contexts. Courts from a range of jurisdictions have been asked to 
resolve these issues, involving a range of values and competing interests. As 
we will see, they have done so in different ways, and some of the results are, 
at first glance, somewhat surprising. 
In this article, I will consider constitutional (and discrimination) issues that 
would arise if an Australian parliament enacted legislation with the effect, 
amongst other things, of prohibiting the wearing of particular items of 
clothing often thought to have religious significance, in particular the hijab, 
burqa or niqab.1
                                                 
* Professor, Deputy Head, University of Southern Queensland Law School. 
 While the ban could apply to other items of clothing or 
1 The hijab is taken to refer to a head covering traditionally worn by Muslim women (the word 
can also be used to explain modest Muslim styles of dress in general), the burqa is a full dress 
covering a woman’s body, including a veil over the woman’s face (this veil is separately 
referred to as a niqab). I will explain my proposed law in more depth later, but in essence it 
would prohibit the covering of the face whilst in public, with clear signals that the law was 
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jewellery of significance in religions other than Islam, given that most of the 
current debate concerns symbols of Islam, I will use this particular context as 
the focus of discussion. In so doing, I will draw briefly upon the rich 
jurisprudence concerning these issues in other jurisdictions, where much more 
litigation has taken place regarding the question than in Australia. I will also 
consider briefly whether a different result would apply if the ban were passed 
at state level. This is not an abstract argument; a current Senator in the 
Australian parliament has personally called for a burqa ban, and private 
members’ bills have been introduced in New South Wales and South 
Australia to introduce such a ban, at least in some circumstances.  
In Part II I set the statutory framework for the discussion that follows. In Part 
III the meaning of the wearing of the hijab and burqa is considered. Part IV 
considers how laws banning the wearing of religious dress or symbols have 
been considered in various courts. In Part V I consider the validity of a 
Commonwealth law that had the effect of banning the wearing of some 
religious dress or symbols. 
II STATUTORY CONTEXT OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
Section 116 of the Commonwealth Constitution forbids the Commonwealth 
parliament to pass a law establishing a religion, imposing a religious 
observance, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion, and forbids a religious 
test to be required as a qualification for office in the Commonwealth.2
The right to freedom of religion is recognised as fundamental in various 
international human rights documents. These include Article 9(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, protecting the right to freedom of 
religion and to manifest that religion in worship or practice, subject to limited 
exceptions.
 It is 
based on the American anti-establishment clause found in the First 
Amendment, and Article VI section 3, regarding the permissibility of religious 
tests in order to take office. No law has ever been struck down as being 
offensive to the section 116 prohibition. The prohibition applies (expressly) 
only to Commonwealth laws, not state laws. 
3
                                                                                                                    
passed with Islamic-style dress in mind. This reflects the kind of law passed in some countries 
where a ban exists – on its face, neutral, but with Islam in mind. 
 It is clear that ‘practice’ here includes the wearing of distinctive 
2 See also Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 14 and Charter of Rights and Responsibilities Act 
2006 (Vic) s 3. Section 46 of the Tasmanian Constitution provides for free profession and 
practice of religion ‘subject to public order and morality’: Constitution Act 1934 (Tas). 
3 Article 9(2) provides for limits to the freedom if they are prescribed by law and necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, protection of the public order, to protect 
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clothing or head covering.4 Very similar provisions appear in Article 18 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 18 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It has been suggested that freedom 
of religion and conscience are the oldest of the internationally recognised 
human rights.5
A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from 
Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and 
attend government favored churches. The centuries immediately before and 
contemporaneous with the colonization of America had been filled with 
turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generated in large part by established 
sects determined to maintain their absolute political and religious 
supremacy.
 This might reflect a long history of violence and persecution in 
relation to religion, oppression of religious minorities, imposition of religion 
by states and so forth. As the United States Supreme Court noted: 
6
The rise of these particular rights may also have been a response to the 
historical view that the monarch, in whom lawmaking functions were reposed, 
was the representative of a higher religious authority. Links with theories of 
natural law may be acknowledged here. The present separation of religion and 
state stands in great contrast to the historical position of the monarch as 
lawmaker and religious figure.
 
7
Despite these provisions,
 
8
                                                                                                                    
health or morals, or to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Related rights include the 
right to respect for private and family life (art 8), right to freedom of expression (art 10), the 
right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of religion (art 14), and the right to 
education (art 2 of the First Protocol). The interpretation of these limits must be strict, and 
limits must be directly related and proportional to the specific need; they must not be applied 
in a discriminatory manner: United Nations Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 
No 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (Art 18)’ (48th sess, 
1993). The European Court has found that restrictions on religious freedom call for ‘very 
strict scrutiny’ by the Court since the right is fundamental in nature: Manoussakis v Greece 
(1997) 23 EHRR 387, 407. 
 some jurisdictions have recently moved to ban 
4 United Nations Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 22: The Right to Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience and Religion (Art 18)’ (48th sess, 1993). 
5 W Cole Durham Jr, ‘Freedom of Religion: The United States Model’ (1994) 42 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 617, 618; Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, Freedom of 
Religion, Apostasy and Islam (Ashgate Publishing, 2004) 10.  
6 Everson v Board of Education 330 US 1 (1947). 
7 Great advocates for religious freedom in the past have included John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 
(1859) 51–2 and John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). 
8 M Todd Parker argues that legal precedents allowing restrictions on religious dress and other 
practice are often not faithful to the requirements of the International Covenant and European 
Covenant on Human Rights: ‘The Freedom to Manifest Religious Belief: An Analysis of the 
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some forms of religious expression.9 As one example for discussion purposes, 
the French Law 2004–228 prohibits in Article 1, in public elementary schools, 
colleges, junior high schools and high schools, the wearing of signs and 
behaviours by which the pupils express openly a religious membership. On its 
face the Article does not single out a particular religion; however in practice it 
has been applied almost exclusively to require that the hijab and burqa not be 
worn at these venues.10
III MEANING OF THE HIJAB AND BURQA 
 In 2010, the French government moved to extend the 
ban beyond educational settings. 
The fundamental question arises as to whether a law with the effect of 
banning the hijab and burqa interferes with the person’s right to freedom of 
religion, and their right to manifest that religion in practice. It is necessary to 
refer to religious documents, as well as views as to the symbolism of such 
dress, in order to answer this question. 
Important sources of information in answering this question are the relevant 
provisions of the Koran (Qur’an) itself. Typically, the following passage is 
quoted: 
And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard 
their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments 
except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw their 
veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their 
husbands, their fathers, their husband’s fathers, their sons, their brothers or 
their brother’s sons, or their women.11
                                                                                                                    
Necessity Clauses of the ICCPR and the ECHR’ (2007) 17 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 91. 
 
9 Links with post 9-11 hysteria have been noted here: ‘women who are readily identified as 
Muslim because they wear a headscarf or veil report that they have often been the target of 
racist violence and discrimination and that this increased post 9-11 as their clothing is now 
read to signify religious fundamentalism, danger and terrorism’: Margaret Thornton and Trish 
Luker, ‘The Spectral Ground: Religious Belief Discrimination’ (2009) 9 Macquarie Law 
Journal 71, 83.  
10 Mark A Levine reports that in the first year following the passage of the French law, 47 
Muslim girls had been expelled from French schools for wearing the hijab: ‘The Modern 
Crusade: An Investigation of the International Conflict between Church and State’ (2009) 40 
California Western International Law Journal 33, 42. 
11 Qur’an 24: 30–31, 24: 60, 33: 59 and 33: 53; Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Qur’an: Text, 
Translation and Commentary (Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an, 2001) 904–5. 
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As with many issues in religion, the above passage has been interpreted in 
different ways. A specific challenge with Islam is that, as Baker notes, there is 
no central authority figure, with the result that followers adhere to different 
forms and interpretations of Islamic tenets.12 Opinions differ as to what 
‘guarding their modesty’ might mean; some interpret this strictly to require 
that the full body garment (burqa) be worn; others see the headscarf as being 
sufficient; others argue that the woman merely cannot wear clothing showing 
the outline of her bosom.13 Others say that the headscarf is a cultural tradition 
that has nothing to do with Islam, and the hijab referred to in the Qur’an is a 
curtain Muhammad used to separate his wives from male visitors, and is not a 
piece of clothing at all.14
There have been other suggestions as to the significance of the hijab or burqa 
that are based on culture rather than religion per se. Tiefenbrun summarises 
these as including the facts that: 
 
It is a positive symbol designating the cultural and religious source of 
protection, respect and virtue; 
It is a positive sign signifying Muslim identity, which might (arguably) be 
seen as opposition to Western civilisation; 
It is a positive sign allowing Muslim women to freely participate in public 
life, preventing women from ‘tempting men and corrupting morality’;15
                                                 
12 Christina Baker, ‘French Headscarves and the US Constitution: Parents, Children and Free 
Exercise of Religion’ (2008) 13 Cardozo Journal of Law and Gender 341, 359. 
 
13 Mukul Saxena, ‘The French Headscarf Law and the Right to Manifest Religious Belief’ 
(2007) 84 University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 765, 779–80; Susan W Tiefenbrun, ‘The 
Semiotics of Women’s Human Rights in Iran’ (2007) 23 Connecticut Journal of International 
Law 1, 25; T Jeremy Gunn, ‘Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United 
States and France’ (2004) 2 Brigham Young University Law Review 419, 471; Robert Kahn, 
‘The Headscarf as Threat: A Comparison of German and US Legal Discourses’ (2007) 40(2) 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 417, 438. 
14 Gunn, above n 13, 471–2. 
15 Aliah Abdo, ‘The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical 
Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf’ (2008) 5 Hastings Race and 
Poverty Law Journal 441, 441, 449: ‘Hijab is not only meant to guard women from 
inappropriate leering male attention, but it is considered to be a liberating experience to be 
free from societal expectations and judgments over a women’s body and other physical 
characteristics’; Mark A Levine, ‘The Modern Crusade: An Investigation of the International 
Conflict Between Church and State’ (2009) 40 California Western International Law Journal 
33, 41. Writing of the Iranian position, Susan W Tiefenbrun claims that ‘women in Iran today 
are no longer excluded from public life and politics, and their participation has in fact 
increased in some areas due to, and not in spite of, the compulsory wearing of the veil or 
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It is a negative symbol of Islam’s power over women.16 (Badinter concurs, 
claiming that the veil ‘is the symbol of the oppression of a sex ... [P]utting a 
veil on the head, this is an act of submission. It burdens a woman’s whole 
life’.)17
Some studies based on interviews with Muslim women suggest that, while 
some Muslim women adopt the veil to comply with family values and 
expectations, it is becoming more common that women choose to wear the 
headscarf themselves, often without pressure and often against their parents’ 
wishes. It is sometimes argued by Muslim women that the veiling forces 
males to deal with them on a mental level as equals, rather than sexual 
 
                                                                                                                    
hijab’: ‘The Semiotics of Women’s Human Rights in Iran’ (2008) 23 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 1, 19.  
16 Susan W Tiefenbrun, ‘The Semiotics of Women’s Human Rights in Iran’ (2008) 23 
Connecticut Journal of International Law 1, 22–3; Stefanie Walterick, ‘The Prohibition of 
Muslim Headscarves from French Public Schools and Controversies Surrounding the Hijab in 
the Western World’ (2006) 20 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 251, 255: 
‘to many people in France, the hijab is also a symbol of the oppression and subjugation of 
Muslim women’; Stasi Commission, ‘Commission de Réflexion sur l’Application du Principe 
de Laïcité dans la République: Rapport au Président de la République’ (Stasi Commission 
Report, December 2003) 46–8; Christopher D Belelieu, ‘The Headscarf as a Symbolic Enemy 
of the European Court of Human Rights’ Democratic Jurisprudence’ (2006) 12 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 573, 583: ‘just like Islam itself, the practice of veiling can take on a 
range of styles and meanings ... (619) the message conveyed (by the wearing of the veil) 
depends on the carrier of the symbol as well as the audience of that symbol’; Adrien Wing 
and Monica Smith, ‘Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?: Muslim Women, France and the 
Headscarf Ban’ (2006) 39 University of California Davis Law Review 743, 746–7, 750–1. 
Chouki El Hamel argues the hijab ensures that men will maintain their status as providers and 
guardians of women and ensures that women remain isolated: ‘Muslim Diaspora in Western 
Europe: The Islamic Headscarf (Hijab), the Media and Muslims’ Integration in France (2002) 
6(3) Citizenship Studies 293, 302; Ghais Jasser, ‘The Twin Evils of the Veil’ (1999) 5 Social 
Identities 31, 37: ‘the veiled woman is reduced to impotence’.  
17 Elisabeth Badinter, Interview with L Joffin (Le Nouvel Observateur (9–15 November 1989) 
7–11; Nilufer Gole, ‘The Voluntary Adoption of Islamic Stigma Symbols’ (2003) 70(3) 
Social Research 809, 817–18; Azar Majedi denounces the veil as ‘the ideological banner of 
Iran’s sexual apartheid and misogynist values’: Women’s Rights vs Political Islam: A Series 
of Political Writings About the Devastating Effects of Political Islam on Women’s Situation 
and the Struggle of Women Against It (Medusa-huset, 2007); Steven G Gey, ‘Free Will, 
Religious Liberty, and a Partial Defense of the French Approach to Religious Expression in 
Public Schools’ (2005) 42 Houston Law Review 1, 62: ‘In France, the government is seeking 
to create a limited area in which especially vulnerable students are free to consider all areas 
and possibilities, free from the constraints imposed by them by the religions and social 
mandates of their community and family’. Cf Aliah Abdo who describes these views as a 
‘severely flawed and false reflection of Islamic principles’: ‘The Legal Status of Hijab in the 
United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim 
Headscarf’ (2008) 5 Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal 441, 441. 
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objects.18 Economics may even play a role.19 A multitude of reasons is 
plausible.20
What critics of Islam fail to understand is that when they see a young 
woman in a hijab she may have chosen the garment as a mark of her defiant 
political identity and also as a way of regaining control over her body.
 Baroness Hale engages with the complex symbolism of the 
wearing of religious dress such as the hijab or burqa in her judgment in R v 
Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School, quoting Yasmin 
Alibhai-Brown: 
21
As Choudhury summarises it, ‘Islamic scholars and feminists continue to 
debate whether hijab is compulsory and, if so, what practices of dress 
constitute valid observance.
  
22
Given this range of views, it would be difficult for a court to determine 
emphatically that the wearing of the hijab or burqa either was, or was not, a 
manifestation of a religious practice. The courts have sometimes expressed 
their reluctance to judge the ‘validity’ of an asserted religious belief, 
acknowledging that religious belief is intensely personal: 
 
[E]mphatically, it is not for the court to embark upon an inquiry into the 
asserted belief and judge its validity by some objective standard such as the 
source material upon which the claimant founds his belief or the orthodox 
teaching of the religion in question or the extent to which the claimant’s 
                                                 
18 Adrien K Wing and Monica Nigh Smith, ‘Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?: Muslim 
Women, France and the Headscarf Ban’ (2006) 39 University of California Davis Law Review 
743, 761–3. Others note that in other cultures, such as the Berber-speaking Tuareg of West 
Africa, men veil, and masks are common in other cultures, which has not attracted the same 
controversy as that of a woman veiling: John Borneman, ‘Veiling and Women’s 
Intelligibility’ (2009) 30(6) Cardozo Law Review 2745, 2748–9. 
19 Dina Alsowayel, ‘The Elephant in the Room: A Commentary on Steven Gey’s Analysis of 
the French Headscarf Ban’ (2006) 42 Houston Law Review 103, 118. 
20 T Jeremy Gunn, ‘Commentary: French Secularism as Utopia and Myth’ (2005) 42 Houston 
Law Review 81, 98; Yael Barbibay, ‘Citizenship Privilege or the Right to Religious Freedom: 
The Blackmailing of France’s Islamic Women (2010) 18 Cardozo Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 159, 201; Karima Bennoune, ‘Secularism and Human Rights: A 
Contextual Analysis of Headscarves, Religious Expression and Women’s Equality Under 
International Law’ (2007) 45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 367, 388; Christopher 
D Belelieu, ‘The Headscarf as a Symbolic Enemy of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
Democratic Jurisprudence: Viewing Islam Through a European Legal Prism in Light of the 
Sahin Judgment’ (2006) 12 Columbia Journal of European Law 573, 583. 
21 [2006] UKHL 15, [94]. 
22 Nusrat Choudhury, ‘From the Stasi Commission to the European Court of Human Rights: 
L’Affaire du Foulard and the Challenge of Protecting the Rights of Muslim Girls’ (2007) 16 
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 199, 218. 
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belief conforms to or differs from the views of others professing the same 
religion. Freedom of religion protects the subjective belief of an individual 
... religious belief is intensely personal and can easily vary from one 
individual to another. Each individual is at liberty to hold his own religious 
beliefs, however irrational or inconsistent they may seem to some, however 
surprising.23
I will now briefly consider the question of how bans or restrictions on 
religious dress have been answered in other jurisdictions.
 
24 Given that these 
issues, as with many other legal issues, are of universal rather than territorial 
concern, and given that the issues have been explored by courts in other 
jurisdictions at some length, it is sensible to consider how other courts have 
approached these issues. The High Court of Australia and courts in other 
nations have increasingly been willing to consider legal developments in 
overseas jurisdictions in developing Australian jurisprudence.25
                                                 
23 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment; Ex parte Williamson [2005] 2 AC 246 
[22] (Lord Nicholls); Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v 
Smith 494 US 872, 887 (1990); Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem (2004) 241 DLR (4th) 1, 27 
[52]; Multani v Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [2006] 1 SCR 256 [35]; 
Manoussakis v Greece (1997) 23 EHRR 387 [45]. Cf early cases, where the Court appeared 
judgmental of the religious views of others whose opinions the judges presumably did not 
share: Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366, 370–2; Mormon Church v United States 
(1889) 136 US 1, 49. 
 Recently the 
24 This raises a separate question as to the extent to which Australian law is, or should be, 
influenced by developments overseas. There is a rich jurisprudence on this question: see for 
example: Hilary Charlesworth et al, No Country is an Island: Australia and International Law 
(UNSW Press, 2006); Kristen Walker, ‘International Law as a Tool of Constitutional Law 
Interpretation’ (2002) 28 Monash University Law Review 85; Devika Hovell and George 
Williams, ‘A Tale of Two Systems: The Use of International Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation in Australia and South Africa’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 95; 
Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Dangerous Liaisons: Globalisation and Australian Public Law’ (1998) 
20 Adelaide Law Review 57.  
25 Justice Kirby was a consistent advocate of the importance of international law; see for 
example Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513, 657–8 
(‘international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common 
law and constitutional law, especially when international law declares the existence of 
universal and fundamental rights. To the full extent that its text permits, Australia’s 
Constitution, as the fundamental law of government in this country, accommodates itself to 
international law’), and in Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 418: ‘where 
there is ambiguity, there is a strong presumption that the Constitution ... is not intended to 
violate fundamental human rights and human dignity’; Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 
562, 616–24; Michael Kirby ‘Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights 
Norms’ (1999) 5 Australian Journal of Human Rights 109. In the landmark Mabo decision, 
Brennan J concluded that ‘international law is a legitimate and important influence on the 
development of the common law, especially when international law declares the existence of 
universal human rights’: Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 42. Some judges 
have been less enthusiastic: for example, Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 
384 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 180 (‘As to the Constitution, 
2011 SECTION 116 OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION AND DRESS RESTRICTIONS 301 
High Court has resorted more frequently to international materials, 
particularly in the rights context. For example, in Roach v Electoral 
Commissioner26 a High Court majority27 (over the express dissent by the 
minority)28 expressly referred to international jurisprudence from Canada and 
Europe on the right to vote to justify its conclusion. In Betfair Pty Ltd v 
Western Australia,29
                                                                                                                    
its provisions are not to be construed as subject to an implication said to be derived from 
international law’: Gleeson CJ McHugh and Gummow JJ); Callinan J in Western Australia v 
Ward (2002) 191 ALR 1, 275 (‘the provisions of the Constitution are not to be read in 
conformity with international law’); Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 589 (McHugh 
J) (‘courts cannot read the Constitution by reference to the provisions of international law that 
have become accepted since the Constitution was enacted in 1900...The claim that the 
Constitution should be read consistently with the rules of international law has been 
decisively rejected by members of this Court on several occasions. As a matter of 
constitutional doctrine, it must be regarded as heretical’; Roach v Electoral Commissioner 
(2007) 233 CLR 162, 221 (Hayne J) and 225 (Heydon J) (denying that international 
instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or European 
Convention on Human Rights could (should) have any influence on interpretation of the 
Australian Constitution. Those who take this view often do so on the basis that the founding 
fathers could not have been influenced by these documents which post-dated the drafting of 
the Australian Constitution; however such a view reifies the intent of the founding fathers at 
the expense of a living organism view of the Constitution which has gained orthodoxy in the 
High Court. There is also evidence of British judges interpreting the common law consistent 
with, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights even prior to the enactment of 
the Human Rights Act: Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 
283–4; R v Advertising Standards Authority Ltd; ex parte Vernons Organisations Ltd [1993] 2 
All ER 202; Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers [1992] QB 770, 811–12: see for 
discussion H Mountfield and M J Beloff, ‘Unconventional Behaviour?: Judicial Uses of the 
European Convention in England and Wales’ (1996) 5 European Human Rights Law Review 
467; A Cunningham, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights, Customary International 
Law and the Constitution’ (1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 537; R 
Higgins, ‘The Relationship Between International and Regional Human Rights Norms and 
Domestic Law’ (1992) 18 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1268; New South Wales Chief Justice 
James Spigelman noted soon after the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) that 
the English common law was ‘developing in the shadow of the jurisdiction of the European 
Court’: ‘Rule of Law: Human Rights Protection’ (1999) 18 Australian Bar Review 29, 32. 
The United States Supreme Court has started to take into account international law in 
interpreting that country’s Constitution: Atkins v Virginia (2002) 536 US 304, 316; Lawrence 
v Texas (2003) 539 US 558, 576-577; Grutter v Bollinger (2003) 539 US 306, 344 (Ginsburg J). 
 six members of the High Court made extensive reference 
to American jurisprudence in their consideration of section 92 of the 
Australian Constitution. The current and a former Chief Justice of the High 
26 (2007) 233 CLR 162. 
27 Gleeson CJ (177–9), Gummow Kirby and Crennan JJ (203–4). 
28 Hayne J (221) and Heydon J (225). 
29 (2008) 234 CLR 418, 459–64 (Gleeson CJ Gummow Kirby Hayne Crennan Kiefel JJ). 
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Court have expressed support for the use of international materials in deciding 
Australian cases.30
IV BANS ON RELIGIOUS DRESS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
 
A Europe 
On first impressions, one might have thought that the protection given to 
religious freedoms by the European Convention on Human Rights might have 
meant that attempts to ban religious dress would founder.31 However, this has 
not in fact been the experience. Often, bans have been upheld as exercises of 
the ‘margin of appreciation’ allowed by the Convention to member states.32
Some cases have been brought under domestic ‘racial discrimination’ 
provisions, rather than ‘right to religion’ provisions.
  
33
                                                 
30 ‘It is...important that we do not allow legal insularity to hamper our national engagement 
with international legal systems. We should derive from these systems such benefits as they 
may offer to the development of our own law and our more effective interaction with other 
countries’ (Chief Justice of Australia Robert French, ‘Oil and Water? – International Law and 
Domestic Law in Australia’ (The Brennan Lecture, Bond University, 26 June 2009), Former 
Chief Justice of Australia Murray Gleeson, ‘Global Influences on the Australian Judiciary 
(Speech delivered at the Australian Bar Association Conference, Paris, 8 July 2002)); see also 
Chief Justice of New South Wales James Spigelman, ‘Corporate Governance and 
International Business Law’, (Book launch, 18 June 2009) and Justice Paul Finn, 
‘Internationalisation or Isolation: The Australian Cul de Sac? The Case of Contract Law’ 
(Speech delivered at the Bond University 20th Anniversary Symposium, 26–27 June 2009). 
 Section 45(3) of the 
31 Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that everyone has the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to manifest one’s 
religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance. This right is subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. 
32 Dahlab v Switzerland (2001) European Court of Human Rights 1, on the basis that the 
teacher there was dealing with very young children such that their vulnerability to influence 
was high, and the court’s conclusion that the wearing of the Islamic scarf there could not be 
reconciled with gender equality, tolerance, and non-discrimination; see also Leyla Sahin v 
Turkey (Application No 44774/98), 10/11/2005. 
33 The Race Relations Act 1976 (UK) s 1 defines racial discrimination to include direct and 
indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination is discrimination against a person on racial 
grounds (race, nationality, ethnicity or national origins). Such discrimination is banned 
absolutely. Indirect discrimination is defined in s 1(1)(b) to mean applying a requirement or 
condition to those not of the same racial group (group defined by reference to colour, race, 
nationality, ethnic or national origin (s 3(1)) as the other, but where the proportion of those of 
the same racial group as the complainant who can comply with the requirement is 
considerably less than the proportion of those not of that racial group who can comply, where 
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Equality Act 2006 (UK), is such a provision. It deals with indirect 
discrimination (to ‘B’) so as to include applying a provision or practice  
(a) … equally to persons not of B's religion or belief; or putting  
(b) … persons of B's religion or belief at a disadvantage compared to some or 
all others (where there is no material difference in the relevant 
circumstances); or putting  
(c) … B at a disadvantage compared to some or all persons who are not of his 
religion or belief (where there is no material difference in the relevant 
circumstances),  
in cases where  
(d) … the person committing the alleged discrimination cannot justify their 
actions by reference to matters other than the complainant’s religion or 
belief.34
However such provisions are subject to exceptions. Article 9(2) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights provides that the right to freedom of 
religion is not absolute and is subject to limits provided by (domestic) law; 
however it requires that these limits be necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of public safety, public order, health, morals and the rights of 
others. Extensive exceptions to racial discrimination laws appear in the Race 
  
                                                                                                                    
the discrimination is not justifiable irrespective of the colour, race, nationality or ethnic or 
national origins of the person to whom it is applied, and as a result the complainant suffers 
detriment. It includes cases where a person applies to the complainant a provision, criterion or 
practice applicable equally to those not of that race, ethnic or national origin, but which puts 
those of the race, ethnic or national origin of the complainant at a particular disadvantage 
compared with others, where it is not a proportional means of achieving a legitimate aim 
(s 1(1A)). These cases include (recently) The Queen on the Application of Watkins-Singh and 
the Governing Body of the Aberdare Girls’ High School and Rhondda Cynon Taf Unitary 
Authority [2008] EWHC 1965 (Admin) and R v Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions 
Appeal Panel of JFS [2009] UKSC 15.  
34 For example, in The Queen on the Application of Watkins-Singh and the Governing Body of 
the Aberdare Girls’ High School and Rhondda Cynon Taf Unitary Authority [2008] EWHC 
1965 (Admin) a school ban on wearing jewellery at school was overturned by the 
complainant, who wished to wear a Kara (plain steel bangle important to some Sikhs). The 
court found the policy to be indirectly discriminatory; it discarded comparisons with cases 
involving Islamic dress on the basis that those forms of dress were more visible, so arguments 
in that context about uniformity, coherence, and communal spirit were not relevant here. See 
also R v Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS [2009] UKSC 15, 
argued under the Race Relations Act 1976 (UK).  
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Relations Act 1976 (UK)35, Equality Act 2006 (UK) and Equality Act 2010 
(UK). Whether these extensive exceptions meet the ‘margin of appreciation’ 
allowed by the Convention in this area is a contentious matter.36 In the current 
context of a law banning the wearing of Islamic religious dress, Muslim 
people would clearly have a right to bring a complaint under the Equality Act 
2006 (UK) and Equality Act 2010 (UK). It would be more difficult to bring a 
complaint under the Race Relations Act, given that its definition of 
discrimination relates to concepts such as ‘race’ and ‘ethnic or national 
origin’.37 Given the standard definition of these concepts in Mandla,38 and the 
fact that Islam can be described as a ‘heterogenous faith’ without some of the 
elements of the Mandla definition, unless the definition were adapted it is 
questionable whether a follower of the Islamic faith could meet this threshold 
requirement.39
B North America 
  
In its interpretation of the free exercise of religion and anti-establishment 
provisions of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has moved from a 
requirement that a law affecting religious practice be justified by a 
                                                 
35 Most importantly, s 4A and s 5 allow for exceptions to the non-discrimination requirements 
of the Act where it is justified by genuine occupational requirements (as does cl 7 of the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1660); see also s 19C, s 
19D, s 19F, s 25 and ss 35–39 of the Act.  
36 Further, the concept of ‘proportionality’ appears in the Race Relations Act 1976 (UK) and 
Equality Act 2010 (UK) to allow some discrimination if it is a proportional means of 
achieving a legitimate end; this is not a feature of the European Convention. Nor does the 
Convention recognise the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination. 
37 Race Relations Act 1976 (UK) s 1(1)(b). 
38 Some have noted the slightly different meaning of the words in s 1(1A) of the Race Relations 
Act 1976 (UK) (‘race or ethnic or national origins’), compared with the wording in s 1 (racial 
grounds, racial group), and acknowledged the provisions in s 1(1A) connote a broader concept 
than the Mandla definition of race to which reference is made later in the paper: R v 
Governing Body of JHS [2009] UKSC 15, Lord Phillips [33], Lord Mance [94]. This 
difference may not be material in the context of discussing the Islamic faith. 
39 The possibility exists, as Ann Blair notes, that a measure affecting Muslims could be 
challenged if it disproportionately affected people of Asian origin, given high Muslim 
populations in Indonesia and Malaysia: ‘Case Commentary – R (SB) v Headteacher and 
Governors of Denbigh High School – Human Rights and Religious Dress in Schools’ (2005) 
17(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 7. Anne Hewitt agrees that a Muslim would in most 
cases not be able to meet the definition of ‘race’ or ‘ethnic group’: ‘Muslims do not satisfy the 
test as a racial group because they are drawn from too diverse a range of backgrounds’: ‘It’s 
Not Because You Wear Hijab, It’s Because You’re Muslim — Inconsistencies in South 
Australia’s Discrimination Laws’ (2007) 7(1) QUT Law and Justice Journal 57, 67. 
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‘compelling governmental interest’40 to a more modest requirement that the 
law not be directed at specific religious practices, or ban the performance of 
acts solely because of their religious motivation.41 This more recent approach 
validates laws which incidentally affect a religious practice, but which are of 
general application and otherwise constitutionally valid.42 The United States 
Supreme Court considered a religious ban in Goldberg v Weinberger, 
Secretary of Defense.43
A majority of the Supreme Court upheld the regulation. The majority 
suggested that the court should be more deferential in the context of military 
provisions than in respect of provisions with civilian application. They stated 
that great deference should be given to the professional judgment of military 
authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest. 
The military had a legitimate interest in ensuring ‘instinctive obedience, unity, 
 At issue here was an air force regulation prohibiting 
employees from wearing headgear while indoors, as part of the uniform 
policy. An employee who was serving as a psychologist on an air force base 
was an Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi, and wore a skullcap (yarmulke) 
while on duty indoors, and under his service cap whilst outdoors. He was 
informed by his commander that he was in breach of the air force uniform 
regulation and that, if he persisted, he could be the subject of a court martial. 
The employee claimed that the regulation was an infringement of his First 
Amendment right to free exercise of religion. 
                                                 
40 Sherbert v Verner 374 US 398 (1963). In Wisconsin v Yoder 406 US 205 (1972) Chief 
Justice Burger wrote for the court that ‘only those interests of the highest order and those not 
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate aims to the free exercise of religion’ (215). The 
Court has not been impressed with laws that single out particular religions for special 
treatment: Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v City of Hialeah 508 US 520 (1993). 
41 So, for instance, a law prohibiting public school teachers from wearing religious emblems or 
insignia in the workplace was invalid, because the law singled out clothing with religious 
connotations as opposed to jewellery or clothing more generally: Nichol v Arin Intermediate 
Unit 28, 268 F. Supp 2d 536 (2003). 
42 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith 494 US 872 
(1990); see also the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 42 USC. 2000bb-1 (1993) in response 
to the Smith decision, and the Supreme Court’s rejoinder in City of Boerne v Flores 521 US 
507 (1997); Vincent Bonventre, ‘Symposium: A Second-Class Constitutional Right? Free 
Exercise and the Current State of Religious Freedom in the United States’ (2007) 70(4) 
Albany Law Review 1399; Steven K Green, ‘Religious Liberty as a Positive and Negative 
Right’ (2007) 70(4) Albany Law Review 1453. Pertinent to current argument is United States v 
Lee 455 US 252 (1982), where the Court upheld a taxation law in the fact of an argument 
from a member of the Amish community that his beliefs precluded him from paying social 
security taxes. The Court concluded the community interest and benefit in an adequate system 
of social security overrode any legitimate objection on religious grounds. 
43 475 US 503 (1986). 
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commitment and esprit de corps’.44 The regulation was not aimed at a 
particular religion.45 The dissentients, on the other hand, said the regulation 
set up an absolute bar to fulfilment of a religious duty.46 They dismissed the 
contention that the wearing of the skullcap would affect discipline within the 
forces as ‘surpass(ing) belief’.47
Courts in the United States have upheld legislation prohibiting public school 
teachers from wearing religious clothing in class.
 It would not affect the government’s military 
mission in the slightest. 
48 Here courts have had to 
grapple with possible inconsistencies that could arise between the anti-
establishment aspect of the First Amendment in relation to religion, and its 
free exercise.49 A decision to suspend a Sikh teacher for wearing white dress 
and a turban to school was upheld;50 as was a decision to dismiss a Muslim 
teacher for wearing a headscarf in class.51 Some cases have been argued on 
the basis of alleged religious discrimination contrary to Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act 1964.52
                                                 
44 Ibid 507 (Burger CJ, White, Powell, Stevens and Rehnquist JJ; Brennan, Blackmun, 
O’Connor and Marshall JJ dissenting). 
 For instance, in Webb v City of Philadelphia, the United 
States District Court found the defendant was justified in insisting that the 
plaintiff not wear hijab to work; this was due to the need for uniformity, 
cohesiveness, co-operation and esprit de corps among police. Disallowing the 
45 Ibid 512. 
46 Ibid 513 (Brennan and Marshall JJ). 
47 Ibid 516 (Brennan and Marshall JJ). 
48 This legislation exists in Oregon, Pennsylvania and Nebraska. Apparently these kinds of 
laws, now mostly repealed, were originally designed to prevent Catholic nuns and priests 
from teaching in public schools, reflecting anti-Catholic sentiment, although they were 
typically facially neutral in terms of religion: Stefanie Walterick, ‘The Prohibition of Muslim 
Headscarves From French Public Schools and Controversies Surrounding the Hijab in the 
Western World’ (2006) 20 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 251, 264.  
49 Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Neutrality of Law Towards Religion’ (1990) 12 Sydney Law Review 
420, 427–47. 
50 Cooper v Eugene School District 723 P 2d 298 (Or 1986). 
51 United States v Board of Education for the School District of Philadelphia 911 F 2d 882, 
893–4 (3d Cir, 1990); but see Nichol v Arin Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F Supp 2d 536 (WD Pa 
2003), where an educational provider’s dress code banning teachers from wearing Christian 
crosses or Stars of David was deemed to violate the free exercise clause). The United States 
Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the teacher dress statutes in these states is 
consistent with the First Amendment: see, for further discussion, Stefanie Walterick, ‘The 
Prohibition of Muslim Headscarves From French Public Schools and Controversies 
Surrounding the Hijab in the Western World’ (2006) 20 Temple International and 
Comparative Law Journal 251, 264–7. 
52 42 USC 2000e-16 (2007). 
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hijab here ensured religious neutrality among police and avoided 
divisiveness.53
The most relevant Canadian precedent here is Multani v Commission Scolaire 
Marguerite-Bourgeoys.
 
54 G was a Sikh student in a Canadian school. He 
believed that his religion required him to wear a kirpan at all times. This is a 
religious object resembling a dagger and required to be made of metal. The 
school’s governing board claimed that the wearing of the kirpan violated the 
school’s code of conduct, which prohibited the carrying of weapons. It cited 
concerns with safety. It was suggested that G could wear a kirpan, as long as 
it was made of a non-metallic substance. G refused this; he subsequently 
brought legal action alleging a breach of the freedom of religion provisions of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.55
All members of the Supreme Court of Canada overturned a finding that the 
interference with religious freedom was justified by section 1 of the Charter. 
There was no doubt that the wearing of the kirpan had religious significance 
to G, and that it was a genuinely held belief. G also believed that the wearing 
of a kirpan made of wood or plastic would not meet his religious obligations. 
The risk of G using his kirpan as a weapon was extremely low. While it could 
in theory be used as a weapon, it was above all a religious symbol; the word 
deriving from ‘kirpa’, meaning mercy, kindness and honour. Although the 
school’s concern with safety was laudable, the school was required to provide 
a reasonable level of safety, not guarantee absolute safety. A ban on metallic 
kirpans was not a proportional response to the public interest in providing a 
safe environment in schools given the lack of any history of violence 
involving them, particularly when Canada had embraced multicultural 
values.
 
56
                                                 
53 Webb v City of Philadelphia 2007 WL 1866763, 1 (E D Pa, June 27, 2007). 
 
54 [2006] 1 SCR 256. 
55 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s 2(a), as well as s 3 of the Quebec Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms. In both cases, as is the case with most human rights provisions, 
the rights expressed are not absolute – in the case of Canada, the allowance is for such 
‘reasonable limits as prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society’ (s 1 of the Charter). Examples where limits on religious freedom were 
justified include Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15 [1996] 1 SCR 825 and B (R) v 
Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 1 SCR. 315; cf Amselem v Syndicat 
Northcrest [2004] 2 SCR 551. 
56 This value was also recognised in an Australian religious discrimination case: Catch the Fire 
Ministries Inc v Islamic Council of Victoria (2006) 15 VR 207, 241 (Nettle JA). 
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C Summary 
Summarising the overseas jurisprudence, although human rights legislation in 
the nations surveyed provides, as does the Australian Constitution, for 
religious freedom, the freedom is not absolute. The courts have shown 
substantial deference to the decision of legislators that curbs on religious 
expression are necessary to further interests such as equality, assimilation, 
esprit de corps, women’s rights and public safety. However, in some cases 
courts have upheld religious freedoms as against attempts by parliaments to 
take away such rights, particularly where the legislation or measure is seen as 
disproportionate to a legitimate objective, and where alternative means, less 
invasive of the right of religious liberty, are available to secure the legitimate 
objective. Some of these cases have been argued on the basis of 
discrimination principles, and key differences between the ECHR rights and 
rights under discrimination law have been noted. This is considered highly 
relevant to the position of Australia, to which our attention will now turn. 
V THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION 
As with the experience elsewhere, rights associated with religion are referred 
to both in the Constitution, and in discrimination legislation.57
                                                 
57 For example, in some states the legislation makes discrimination based on religion or 
religious belief unlawful: Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 7(i); Anti-Discrimination Act 
1998 (Tas) s 16(o); Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) s 6(n); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 
(WA) pt IV; Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 7(i); Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (NT) s 
19(l)(m). Of indirect relevance are provisions outlawing discrimination on the basis of race: 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 9; Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) pt 2; Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 7(g); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) pt 4; Anti-
Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 16(a), Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) s 6(m); Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) pt III; Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 7(h); Anti-
Discrimination Act 1992 (NT) s 19(1)(a). See for further discussion of these statutes Garth 
Blake, ‘God, Caesar and Human Rights: Freedom of Religion in Australia in the 21st Century’ 
(2009) 31 Australian Bar Review 279; Reid Mortensen, ‘Rendering to God and Caesar: 
Religion in Australian Discrimination Law’ (1995) 18 University of Queensland Law Journal 
208; religious vilification is also proscribed in some jurisdictions: Patrick Parkinson, 
‘Religious Vilification, Anti-Discrimination Laws and Religious Minorities in Australia: The 
Freedom to be Different’ (2007) 81(12) Australian Law Journal 954.  
 I will focus 
primarily on the constitutional provisions, given that my main question in this 
paper is the extent to which the Commonwealth could legislate to ban Islamic 
clothing. I will summarise the law first, before considering its application to a 
ban on religious dress. 
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The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) applies to the Commonwealth.58
When we consider the validity of a state law banning religious dress, the 
question of discrimination becomes more important. This is because, while 
the Commonwealth may well be able to pass discriminatory legislation 
provided that a head of power exists, the states would find it more difficult, 
given possible inconsistency between such legislation and the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). Obviously, if there were inconsistency 
between a state Act and the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), the state 
act would, by virtue of section 109 of the Constitution, be invalid. The same 
fate could not befall Commonwealth legislation.   
 
Section 9 prima facie prohibits distinctions based on race, colour, descent or 
national or ethnic origin which impair the exercise of human rights and 
section 10 provides for equality before the law, denying the validity of laws 
which mean that a person of a particular race, nationality or ethnic origin does 
not enjoy rights enjoyed by others of another race. However, there is debate as 
to the extent to which these provisions could apply to discrimination based on 
religion, rather than on race, and the Commonwealth could always amend the 
provisions of the Act since there is nothing enshrining its contents.  
Constitutionally, section 116 prohibits the Commonwealth from passing any 
law establishing a religion or from prohibiting the free exercise of any 
religion.59 Very few cases alleging a breach of section 116 have been brought, 
and in no case has a law been struck down as being offensive to section 116. 
The leading case is Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v 
Commonwealth.60
                                                 
58 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 6. 
 There the federal government seized property owned by the 
plaintiffs pursuant to powers conferred on the Governor-General by national 
security regulations. The plaintiffs had been declared by that individual to be 
prejudicial to the war effort. It was said that followers of the Jehovah’s 
Witness faith believed the Australian Government to be organs of Satan; they 
declined to take an oath of allegiance to the monarch, and believed that God’s 
law prevailed over Parliament’s laws. The Adelaide Company argued that the 
regulations were not supported by the defence power, and that they were 
inconsistent with section 116, in particular the free exercise of religion aspect. 
59 The section also prevents the Commonwealth from passing a law imposing any religious 
observance, or imposing a religious test as a qualification for office or public trust under the 
Commonwealth, but these aspects of s 116 have never been litigated. Some tension between 
clauses in s 116 are possible, in particular the anti-establishment and free exercise aspects: 
Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Neutrality of Law Towards Religion’ (1990) 12 Sydney Law Review 420, 
427; Joshua Puls, ‘The Wall of Separation: Section 116, the First Amendment and 
Constitutional Religious Guarantees’ (1998) 26(1) Federal Law Review 139, 159–60. 
60 (1943) 67 CLR 116. 
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The Court decided the matter on the defence power argument and invalidated 
the law; the judges considered (in dicta) the reach of section 116. Latham CJ 
noted that section 116 protected the ‘exercise’ of religion; this included acts 
done in pursuance of religious beliefs as part of religion.61 He noted the strong 
similarity between section 116 and the relevant provisions of the United 
States Constitution, to which reference was made above, concluding that there 
was ‘full legal justification for adopting in Australia an interpretation of 
section 116 which had, before the enactment of the Commonwealth 
Constitution, already been given to similar words in the United States’.62 He 
concluded, in terms with which the others agreed,63 that the religious freedom 
protected by section 116 was not absolute, and would be subject, at least, to 
the validity of laws passed designed to ensure the maintenance of civil 
government.64
                                                 
61 Ibid 124. 
 He inferred that a balancing exercise was necessary in relation 
62 Ibid 131; Starke J also observed that the Australian provision was substantially the same as 
the United States provision, and referred to the American case law (155); speaking of the 
similarity, Pannam spoke of the ‘fairly blatant piece of transcription’ involved in the drafting 
of s 116: Clifford L Pannam, ‘Travelling Section 116 with a US Road Map’ (1963) 4 
Melbourne University Law Review 41, 41. On the other hand, in at least two respects the 
interpretation of the two provisions has diverged: in relation to government funding for 
certain denominational schools, this was invalidated as a breach of the First Amendment anti-
establishment clause in Everson v Board of Education 330 US 1, 15 (1947) (although see now 
Zelman v Simmons-Harris 536 US 639 (2002)) but upheld by the High Court of Australia 
despite a s 116 challenge in Attorney-General (Vic) ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 
CLR 559; further the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the anti-establishment 
clause broadly to invalidate laws which advance or benefit religion (see, eg, McCreary 
County v ACLU of Kentucky 545 US 844 (2005)) while the High Court of Australia has 
interpreted it strictly to forbid only the actual establishment of a religion (Attorney-General 
(Vic) ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559); see for further discussion 
Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Neutrality of Law Towards Religion’ (1990) 12 Sydney Law Review 420. 
The question of the extent to which the American provision was similar to, and thus should 
guide interpretation of, the Australian provision divided the High Court of Australia in 
Attorney-General (Vic) ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559, with a majority 
emphasising the literal differences (laws ‘for’ in s 116, compared with laws ‘respecting’ in the 
First Amendment: Barwick CJ 579, Gibbs J 598, Wilson J 653; Cf Murphy J 622 (dissenting). 
63 Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 
116, 149 (Rich J). 
64 Ibid 126; similarly Rich J (149) and Starke J (155), who referred to laws ‘reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the community and in the interests of social order’ being valid, 
despite interference with religious freedoms; McTiernan J referred to laws so the 
‘Commonwealth could defend itself against invasion’ (157); and Williams J spoke of laws 
necessary to ensure the nation was safe and its existence preserved (160). Although these 
comments were made in dicta, they are narrower than the margin of appreciation exception 
that the European Court has applied in its decisions in relation to laws that restrict religious 
freedoms, but which arguably do so for justified reasons. It may be that if the High Court 
were again asked to consider a law in terms of s 116, it would cast the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ more broadly than the dicta comments in Jehovah’s Witness suggest. 
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to laws challenged under the provision, where the end sought to be achieved 
by the law which was invasive of religious freedom would be weighed against 
the extent to which religious freedom had been infringed. This would 
establish whether the infringement was ‘undue’.65
Another leading case on section 116 was Attorney-General for the State of 
Victoria (ex rel Black) v Commonwealth of Australia,
 
66 involving a challenge 
to Commonwealth financial support to non-government schools. The Court 
concluded that financial support to such schools did not infringe the anti-
establishment aspect of section 116. Most relevant here is the discussion by 
the judges of whether laws caught by section 116 needed to have a particular 
purpose. A clear majority of the judges thought that the section was directed 
to prohibiting laws that had a particular purpose, such as (in the context of 
that case) the purpose of establishing a religion,67 although two of this 
majority seemed to allow the possibility that the provision could catch laws 
with this effect — Gibbs J68 and Mason J.69  When these judgments are 
considered together with those of Stephen and Murphy JJ, this can be taken to 
be a majority in Black in favour of section 116 applying to laws which 
affected religion, although that effect was not the purpose, or main purpose, of 
the legislation.70
This debate continued in Kruger v Commonwealth
 
71
                                                 
65 Ibid 128. 
 There the court 
concluded that, in order for a law to be offensive to the section, it must have THE 
66 (1981) 146 CLR 559. 
67 Ibid 584 (Barwick CJ), 598 (Gibbs J), 615 (Mason J), 653 (Wilson J); in contrast Stephen J 
said that the anti-establishment clause of s 116 (at least) was directed to laws with a particular 
effect (605), Murphy J said it meant ‘with respect to’ or concerning religion (622).  
68 Ibid 604: ‘purpose or effect’. 
69 Ibid 615: ‘purpose or result’. 
70 Reference to the effect of the legislation, as opposed to its purpose, in the context of s 116 
also appears in lower court decisions. See, eg, Sundberg J in Halliday v Commonwealth of 
Australia [2000] FCA 950 [21]: ‘Nor is it a law that has the result or effect of prohibiting the 
free exercise of a Muslim’s or anyone else’s religion’. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs v Lebanese Moslem Association (1987) 17 FCR 373, two members of the Court 
alluded to this matter, with Fox J applying the test of whether the law had the ‘purpose or 
effect’ of establishing a religion, prohibiting the free exercise etc (374). In other words, a law 
with either the purpose or the effect of infringing religious freedoms could, according to the 
court, be offensive to s 116. This is clearly broader than the view in Kruger (discussed 
below). Jackson J assumed that the purpose of the law could be gathered from its effect or 
result, such that if the law had the effect proscribed by s 116, it would be deemed to have had 
this purpose (388). 
71 (1997) 190 CLR 1. 
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purpose of achieving an object which section 116 forbids.72 Presumably, a law 
without this purpose, but having this effect, would not be offensive to section 
116, according to this view.73 This view, which is presumably74 based on the 
word ‘for’ in the section,75 has the effect of limiting the impact of the section 
and its ability to protect religious freedoms.76
Given the relative dearth of authority concerning section 116 in Australia, 
fundamental issues such as the purpose of the section have remained 
relatively unresolved. In the light of past experiences, particularly in other 
jurisdictions, where some governments acted to impose particular religious 
views and/or suppress minority religious views, it is possible to read the 
 
                                                 
72 To like effect are comments of Mason ACJ and Brennan J in Church of the New Faith v 
Commissioner of Payroll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120, 135–6 that laws which do not 
discriminate against religion generally or against particular religions or against conduct of a 
kind which is characteristic only of a religion are not offensive to s 116. 
73 Gaudron J claimed in Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 that purpose was the 
‘criterion and sole criterion’ selected by s 116 for invalidity (132). Toohey J was slightly 
more equivocal in that case, concluding that the purpose should be taken into account, and 
referring to whether it was necessary that ‘a purpose’ be to prohibit the free exercise of 
religion, rather than this being the predominant or only purpose, for the provision to be invalid 
under s 116 (86). See also Latham CJ in Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v 
Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 who argued that purpose was a factor to be taken into 
account (132). See also comments considering the ‘effect’ of legislation in relation to s 116 in 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Lebanese Moslem Association (1987) 17 FCR 
373, 374 (Fox J) and 388 (Jackson J), and Halliday v Commonwealth of Australia [2000] 
FCA 950 [21] (Sundberg J). For criticism of the High Court’s approach here see Stephen 
McLeish, ‘Making Sense of Religion and the Constitution: A Fresh Start for Section 116’ 
(1992) 18 Monash University Law Review 207, 233. 
74 No reason is given by Brennan CJ in Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1; the 
assertion that, ‘to attract invalidity under s 116, a law must have the purpose of achieving an 
object which s 116 forbids’ appears without reference to prior authority or further elaboration 
of rationale. 
75 Toohey J justified it on this basis in Kruger (86), citing the judgment of Barwick CJ in 
Attorney-General (Vic) ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559 for the 
proposition, as did Gaudron J (132–3); Gummow J took the same view, citing the judgment of 
Gibbs J in Black (160). It was not necessary for Dawson and McHugh JJ to consider this 
issue, because of their view that s 116 did not apply to laws passed pursuant to s 122. 
However, the view that the word ‘for’ means that the law has a particular purpose has been 
challenged, with Dixon J in Lamshed v Lake (1958) 99 CLR 132, 141 concluding that ‘for’ (in 
the context of s 122) meant ‘with respect to’; see also Murphy J in Black, 622. 
76 There are links here with the American jurisprudence, most notably Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith 494 US 872 (1990), where the United 
States Supreme Court moved from a requirement that a law affecting religious practice be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest to a more modest requirement that the law not 
be directed at specific religious practices, validating laws that may incidentally affect 
religious freedoms in pursuance of another objective. 
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section as a strong assertion (re-assertion) of the separation of church from 
state. Murphy J (dissenting) alluded to this history briefly in Black.77
An example of this view is contained in a letter from Thomas Jefferson to a 
group of Danbury Baptists: 
  
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man 
and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; 
that the legislative powers of government reach actions only, and not 
opinions – I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole 
American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof’, thus building a wall of separation between church and state. 
Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of 
the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of 
those sentiments which tend to restore man to all his natural rights, 
convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.78
The section might, on the other hand, be read more modestly, as simply a 
clarification by the drafters of the Constitution that matters of religion or 
 
                                                 
77 ‘The purpose of the United States establishment clause was clearly to prevent the recognition 
of and assistance to religion which plagued European countries over many centuries. The 
religious wars of ancient times were repeated after the Middle Ages and into modern times. In 
the United Kingdom the struggle between the contending Catholic and Protestant factions, 
with the emergence of Presbyterians, Methodists, Quakers, Lollards and many other religious 
groups, was a bitter illustration of the attempts of religious factions to get the assistance of the 
state in propagating their views and if possible suppressing their rivals’: (1981) 146 CLR 559, 
625. The colonies that would unite to become Australia did not experience this kind of angst 
based on religious differences and there was not the experience of a government-imposed 
religion or (formal) sanctions against minority religions, although Stephen J in Attorney-
General (Vic) ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559 comments that the creation 
of a state church nearly occurred in the years prior to federation (608). Mason J in the same 
case states that s 116 reflected the ‘expression of a profound sentiment favouring religious 
equality in the Australian colonies’ (615). Pannam notes that there has been little evidence of 
official religious intolerance or discrimination in Australia, and that s 116 differs from its 
American counterpart in that it does not reflect a long struggle for religious freedom: Clifford 
L Pannam ‘Travelling Section 116 with a US Road Map’ (1963) 4 Melbourne University Law 
Review 41, 50. 
78 This passage was referred to with approval in the United States Supreme Court decision 
Everson v Board of Education (1947) 330 US 1. See also Chief Justice Burger in Walz v Tax 
Commission of the City of New York (1970) 397 US 664, 669: ‘we will not tolerate either 
governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion’. In Church of 
the New Faith v Commissioner of Payroll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120, 130 Mason ACJ 
and Brennan J claimed that ‘freedom of religion, the paradigm freedom of conscience, is of 
the essence of a free society’. 
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religious observance were intended to be matters regulated by state 
governments rather than by the then new federal government.79
A Would a Commonwealth or State Law With the 
Effect of Banning the Hijab or Burqa Be 
Constitutionally Valid? 
  
1 Commonwealth Law 
Assuming that the Commonwealth did attempt to legislate a ban on religious 
dress including the hijab or burqa, at least in some contexts, would a 
constitutional challenge be successful?80 For discussion purposes, it may be 
best to be specific. Assume that a law is passed making it an offence for a 
person to appear in public whilst their face is covered. Whilst the law is 
facially neutral , it is clear (for example, from the Minister’s speech and the 
events preceding the introduction of the law) that it is intended to be applied 
specifically to stop women of the Islamic faith from wearing a burqa or hijab 
in public, though it may have other applications as well. While section 116 
deals with a number of different types of law, I will confine the discussion to 
that limb of the section preventing the Commonwealth from passing a law 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion, since that is the limb of prime 
relevance to the discussion.81
                                                 
79 This was apparently the view of at least Higgins in the Convention Debates: ‘the powers that 
the states individually have of making such laws as they like with regard to religion shall 
remain undisturbed and unbroken, and to make it clear that in framing this Constitution, there 
is no intention whatever to give to the Federal Parliament the power to interfere in these 
matters ... I simply want to leave things as they are. I do not want to interfere with any right 
the state has’: Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention (Third 
Session), Melbourne, 20 January – 17 March 1898, 1769. However, originally the section 
applied to state laws, and the section appears in a part of the Constitution entitled ‘The 
States’. See also Attorney-General (Vic) ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559, 
609: ‘(s 116) cannot readily be viewed as the repository of some broad statement of principle 
concerning the separation of church and state, from which may be distilled the detailed 
consequences of such separation...by fixing upon four specific restrictions of legislative 
power, the form of the section gives no encouragement to the undertaking of any such 
distillation’ (Stephen J), and Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 125: ‘(s 116) must 
be construed as no more than a limitation on Commonwealth legislative power’ (Gaudron J). 
 
80 I assume for current purposes that a head of power exists. I do not propose to discuss the 
possible heads of power to support such legislation in any depth; however ss 51(29) and (6) 
are possible sources. More detailed consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of the 
article, which is focused on the constitutionality of a ban in terms of s 116. 
81 Such a law would clearly not establish a religion, and it would not impose a religious 
observance, or impose a religious test as a requirement of Commonwealth office. 
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It is argued that such a law would prohibit the ‘free exercise of religion’, and 
so prima facie be invalid pursuant to section 116. While there are different 
views of the meaning of wearing particular clothing such as the burqa, at least 
some link between its wearing and religion has been established. A law 
banning its wearing would appear prima facie to be a prohibition of the free 
exercise of religion.  
There have been few cases on the section to assist with interpretation. As with 
its rights jurisprudence more generally, the High Court has tended to read 
express provisions in the Constitution conferring religious freedoms 
conservatively. In Kruger, Black and Church of the New Faith, members of 
the Court claimed that in order to be invalid under section 116, the law would 
have to have THE purpose of prohibiting the free exercise of religion. If this 
narrow interpretation were continued, the Commonwealth might argue the 
purpose of the law is quite benign – as has happened in the cases cited earlier, 
for instance, that the law promotes civil ‘unity’ or prevents the subjugation of 
women that some argue is symbolised by the burqa, as has occurred in the 
European82 and American cases.83 Given the law does not expressly apply to 
such clothing, it could also be justified on public safety grounds – that 
individuals in society need to be identifiable. If this argument were accepted, 
the law may be valid; its purpose might be held to be legitimate; while there 
would be an effect on religious expression, it may not be sufficient, according 
to Kruger and Black, to invalidate the law, because the law lacked such a 
purpose.84 In the language of Mason ACJ and Brennan J in Church of the New 
Faith, the law would not discriminate against religion, or against conduct 
which was characteristic only of a religion.85
It is generally contended that human rights are not absolute, and the courts 
often engage in a balancing exercise, comparing the infringement of human 
rights the legislation might create with legitimate objectives to which it might 
be aimed. Latham CJ made this comment expressly in relation to religious 
  
                                                 
82 See, eg, Dahlab v Switzerland (2001) European Court of Human Rights 1; Leyla Sahin v 
Turkey (Application No 44774/98), 10/11/2005. 
83 See, eg, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon et al v Smith 494 
US 872 (1990); Goldberg v Weinberger, Secretary of Defense 475 US 503 (1986). 
84 This narrow view of the s 116 protection was also taken by Mason ACJ and Brennan J in 
Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Payroll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120, 135–6 
where his Honour concluded that conduct was not protected by s 116 if it did ‘not 
discriminate against religion generally or against particular religions or against conduct of a 
kind which is characteristic only of a religion’. Similar comments are made by Griffith CJ in 
Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366, 369: ‘to require a man to do a thing which has 
nothing at all to do with religion is not prohibiting him from a free exercise of religion’. 
85 Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Payroll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120, 135–6. 
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freedom in the Jehovah’s Witness case. There the court said that religious 
freedoms would have to cede to laws deemed necessary to preserve the 
maintenance of a civil government. The cases referred to above from Europe 
and North America also reflect a balancing exercise, considering the supposed 
need for laws that might incidentally affect human rights, their proportionality 
to any claimed legitimate ends, the availability of less invasive measures to 
achieve the legitimate objective etc. 
Considering the Australian precedents, a law prohibiting a person from 
appearing in public whilst their face was covered would be difficult to justify 
on the grounds discussed in the Jehovah’s Witness case. It is difficult see how 
such a ban would be necessary to ‘preserve a civil government’. When the 
matter is considered again, the High Court may adopt different words in 
expressing a test for when laws which infringe religious freedom may 
nevertheless be valid.  
Despite this, on the current state of the High Court jurisprudence on section 
116, a law with the effect of banning religious dress such as a burqa would 
probably not be unconstitutional. This is because it would not meet the current 
test for invalidity set out in Kruger and Black ie that only a law with the 
express purpose of infringing the rights mentioned in section 116 is 
invalidated by that section. The federal government could state that its 
purpose in enacting the law was to promote civil harmony or assimilation, or 
to promote public safety by making it easier to identify everyone, and 
according to the High Court, this would be a decisive factor in declaring the 
law to be valid. The court might draw on the European and American 
precedents in support of this position, to find that the law was justified in 
terms of preserving equality and liberty among citizens, and avoiding 
supposed subjugation of women. However, as has been indicated, the research 
is difficult to reconcile with a bald assertion that the wearing of religious dress 
such as the burqa is necessarily a sign of subjugation of women or gender or 
religious inequality.  
I would prefer the High Court took a broader view to the question of the rights 
protected by section 116 of the Constitution than previous cases have 
provided. The test in Kruger for invalidity pursuant to the section, that the law 
be passed with the purpose of restricting religious freedom, is with respect too 
narrow. As interpreted by the High Court, this section has very little 
operation, in that the Commonwealth, by carefully drafting its legislation, can 
ensure that its law avoids invalidity under section 116, even when the law 
clearly has the effect of restricting the rights implied in section 116. There is 
hope for a broader view, with some of the judgments in Black allowing that a 
law which had the effect or result of interfering with religion may be 
2011 SECTION 116 OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION AND DRESS RESTRICTIONS 317 
offensive to section 116, even if that were not its purpose.86 This is of course 
not the only context in which the High Court has read ‘rights’ contained in the 
Constitution narrowly, so that they have little if any scope and can be 
subverted by intelligent drafting.87
This issue divided the United Kingdom Supreme Court recently in R v 
Governing Body of JFS.
 Rights provisions must not be read 
pedantically or narrowly, or in such a way as to make them easy for the 
drafter to subvert. Nor should the courts blindly accept claims by parliament 
that limits on religious freedoms are justified on ‘equality’, ‘assimilation’, 
‘esprit de corps’ or ‘women’s rights’ grounds as has occurred elsewhere, 
without a thorough investigation of the evidence. 
88 There, in the context of considering a complaint 
under the Race Relations Act 1976 (UK)(rather than religious freedom per se), 
several judges indicated either unreservedly,89 or with some reservations,90
                                                 
86 As earlier noted, Gibbs, Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ. 
 
that the motive of the decision maker was not relevant in considering whether 
their behaviour constituted discrimination under that legislation. Further, as 
Lord Mance indicated in that case, the International Convention on 
Elimination on all Kinds of Racial Discrimination prohibits discrimination on 
the ground of race/national or ethnic origin if it has the purpose or effect of 
impairing the exercise of human rights. Whilst it is appreciated that this 
provision is not automatically relevant in the context of discussing protection 
of a right in a Constitution (or Convention) rather than discrimination 
legislation, there seems to be little logic in applying different principles in the 
discrimination context than to discrimination in the context of a constitutional 
freedom, where the text does not require it. Anti-discrimination rights are 
remedial in nature, and no pedantic or narrow view should be taken of them. 
87 Section 80 is one example: Amelia Simpson and Mary Wood, ‘A Puny Thing Indeed — 
Cheng v The Queen and the Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury’ (2001) 29 Federal Law 
Review 95; James Stellios, ‘The Constitutional Jury – A Bulwark of Liberty?’ (2005) 27 
Sydney Law Review 113; James Stellios, ‘The High Court’s Recent Encounters with Section 
80 Jury Trials’ (2005) 29 Criminal Law Journal 139; Anthony Gray, ‘Mockery and the Right 
to Trial by Jury’ (2006) 6(1) QUT Law and Justice Journal 66. 
88 [2009] UKSC 15. 
89 Lord Phillips [20], Lady Hale [57], and Lord Mance [81]. 
90 Lord Kerr concluded that a benign motive would not save otherwise discriminatory 
behaviour, but that mental processes leading to the decision may be considered [120]; Lord 
Clarke found that state of mind was irrelevant [132] but conceded that sometimes at a 
preliminary stage questions of motive might be relevant [145], as did Lord Walker [192] 
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The approach of the Canadian court in Multani is also preferred here, asking 
whether the religious ban is proportional91 to a legitimate objective, and 
taking into account the multicultural nature of modern society, as well as 
values of tolerance. In the author’s view, such an approach would better 
balance the right to religious freedom with other fundamental rights in 
society, and ensure that the section would have some substantive effect, rather 
than the intent of the section being easily subverted, which the current 
interpretation allows. Such an approach would not be foreign to Australia; it 
would be similar in approach to the High Court’s interpretation of the implied 
freedom of political communication, which also reflects an approach 
balancing fundamental human rights with legitimate reasons that parliament 
may have for curtailing such rights in some cases.92 It is what Latham CJ was 
surely suggesting in Adelaide Company when he reiterated that the section 
116 freedom was not absolute, and that it was a matter for the Court to 
determine whether the interference with religion created by a law was an 
‘undue’ one.93
Adoption of this position would allow the accommodation of cases where 
laws with legitimate aims, and with incidental and marginal impact (if any) on 
religion, are not invalidated by virtue of section 116. So, for example, facts 
evident in cases such as Daniels v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation,
 
94
                                                 
91 This concept is also embraced in the context of United Kingdom discrimination legislation: 
Race Relations Act 1976 s 1, Equality Act 2010 s 19, and Equality Act 2006 s 45. This would 
allow the Commonwealth to enact laws which truly had marginal and incidental impact on 
religion, such as taxation laws (Halliday v Commonwealth [2000] FCA 950) and border 
control (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Lebanese Moslem Association) (1987) 
71 ALR 578). 
 
involving a challenge to taxation laws on the basis that a very small 
percentage of moneys so raised were spent on procedures of which the 
applicant strongly disagreed. A challenge to tax law on such grounds should 
fail because the effect of the tax law on religious views, if any, is so slight and 
incidental as not to amount to an infringement of section 116 rights, which are 
not absolute.  
92 Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1. 
93 Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 
116, 131. 
94 Daniels v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] SASC 431 (where a very small amount 
of taxation raised was paid in Medicare rebates for abortion services, about which the 
applicant complained on the basis of s 116). His arguments were, correctly in the author’s 
view, rejected. 
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Similarly, such an approach would support the decision reached in Halliday v 
Commonwealth of Australia,95 where a member of the Muslim community 
objected to the goods and services tax because the system may, depending on 
whether persons with whom the business dealt had an ABN or not, require the 
applicant to collect taxation revenue on behalf of the government. The 
applicant claimed this was offensive to his Muslim beliefs, including 
specifically the obligation not to ‘tax, tithe or charge interest’. Sundberg J in 
that case dismissed the section 116 objection on the basis that the 
government’s interest in a sound and broad based tax system was of such a 
high order that it overrode any conflicting religious belief,96 again reflecting a 
balancing/proportionality approach espoused by the Canadian court in 
Multani and by Latham CJ in Adelaide Company.97
Another argument regarding the possible application of section 116 here 
might be that such a law does not ‘prohibit’ the free exercise of religion; 
rather, it limits one possible manifestation of that religion, namely the wearing 
of a face veil. The word ‘prohibit’ is obviously a strong one – it certainly 
would prevent laws banning particular religions, but arguably a ban on the 
wearing of a face veil does not ‘prohibit’ the free exercise of Islam (of course, 
to the extent that the wearing of the veil is a free exercise of Islamic beliefs). 
It merely limits one aspect of it.
 
98
                                                 
95 [2000] FCA 950. 
 The woman would be free to wear the veil 
in the home, and practice other manifestations of that faith. 
96 Ibid [21]. Sundberg J was fortified in this view by the fact that the applicant could, by 
carefully choosing those with whom he dealt business wise, avoid having to collect the tax on 
the government’s behalf. His Honour also used the ‘purpose’ test in considering whether the 
law infringed s 116, though I have suggested earlier in this paper that this test should not be 
used. 
97 Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 
116. On similar facts, it will be recalled that the United States Supreme Court took a similar 
approach in United States v Lee in rejecting a challenge to social security taxation laws by a 
person of the Amish faith. The Court found that the public interest in a robust, broad-based 
social security taxation system overrode individual objections on religious grounds, even if 
genuinely held: 455 US 252 (1982). 
98 There have been suggestions that s 116 does not prevent the Commonwealth from passing a 
law which would have the effect of making a particular aspect of a religious activity contrary 
to law: Church of the New Faith v Commissioner for Payroll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120, 
135–6 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J); R v Gorton [2001] QCA 43. Similar in some ways is the 
reasoning of Barton J in Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366, 372 dismissing the 
applicant’s religious objections to having to obtain military training on the basis that the 
applicant could still exercise his religion freely if he did the required training. Similarly here, 
it could be argued that this ban does not stop anyone from exercising their religious faith in 
other ways, as long as they respect the public ban on face covering. Applying these principles, 
Sundberg J in Halliday v Commonwealth of Australia [2000] FCA 950 states that the goods 
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On the other hand, there is evidence that most, if not all, Muslim women 
would not wear the veil in private anyway, because the whole point of it is to 
subvert the gaze of men who are strangers to the woman, and these 
interactions are overwhelmingly going to occur in public. 
Such a ban may well infringe the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), about 
which more will be said below in the context of a state ban on the burqa. 
However, it is of course open to the federal parliament to amend or repeal the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) as they see fit. 
2 State Law 
The religious freedom contained in section 116 is expressly confined to laws 
passed by the Commonwealth. As a result, it would be difficult to argue 
against the law on the basis of that section.99
An argument may be made against such state laws by having regard to 
discrimination laws. Here the focus will be on federal discrimination laws. 
Although each state has its own discrimination laws, these could easily be 
amended or repealed. A later law inconsistent with an earlier law is implicitly 
deemed to amend or repeal the earlier law, even in the absence of express 
words. Further, each state parliament has generally plenary law making 
powers
 
100
A stronger argument would be that the state law was inconsistent with the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), and invalid for that reason.
 to pass laws for the peace, welfare and good government of the 
State.   
101
                                                                                                                    
and services tax law considered there ‘at most ... requires a person to do an act that his 
religion forbids. But that is not within s 116’ [21]. 
 Section 
99 Elsewhere, I have made an argument that express constitutional rights, including the right to 
freedom of religion, should (despite the express words of the Constitution) apply to the states: 
Anthony Gray, ‘Applying Provisions of the Constitutions to Protect Human Rights from 
Intrusion by State Governments’ (2011) 18(4) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 229.  
100 A slight qualification is appropriate in relation to those jurisdictions with charters — 
Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory. However, their significance should not be 
overstated, since they adopt the ‘declaration of incompatibility’ model rather than the ‘power 
to declare invalid’ model. These words are not words of limitation: Union Steamship Co of 
Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1. 
101 Section 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution (conflict between a valid Commonwealth 
law and valid state law is resolved in favour of the former). Of course, it may also be 
inconsistent with state discrimination laws, but these are not doubly entrenched, and thus 
could be easily amended or repealed by a state parliament. Discussion of these laws appears 
in Margaret Thornton and Trish Luker, ‘The Spectral Ground: Religious Belief 
Discrimination’ (2009) 9 Macquarie Law Journal 71; Reid Mortensen, ‘Rendering to God 
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9(1) of the Act makes it unlawful for a person to do an act involving a 
distinction or restriction based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic 
origin102 which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of any human right or 
fundamental freedom.103 Section 9(1A) applies where a person applies a 
requirement to another person that is not ‘reasonable’ having regard to the 
circumstances of the case, if the other person does not comply with it. The 
requirement must have the purpose or effect of impairing the equal enjoyment 
of a human right by those of the same colour, descent, national or ethnic 
origin as the complainant. Section 10 relevantly states that if by reason of a 
state law persons of a particular race, colour, national or ethnic origin (‘first 
race’) do not enjoy a right enjoyed by persons of another race, colour or 
national or ethnic origin (‘second race’), then those of the first mentioned race 
enjoy the right to the same extent as those of the second race. In other words, 
the discrimination is overturned.104
While the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) does not, on its terms, outlaw 
religious discrimination, religious discrimination may in effect be prohibited 
given the above references in s10 to ‘ethnic origin’. Australian and United 
Kingdom precedents have confirmed that Jewish people can comprise an 
 
                                                                                                                    
and Caesar: Religion in Australian Discrimination Law’ (1995) 18 University of Queensland 
Law Journal 208; Rachel Bloul, ‘Anti-Discrimination Laws, Islamophobia and Ethnicization 
of Muslim Identities in Europe and Australia’ (2008) 28(1) Journal of Muslim Minority 
Affairs 7; Anne Hewitt, ‘It’s Not Because You Wear Hijab, It’s Because You’re Muslim’ – 
Inconsistencies in South Australia’s Discrimination Laws’ (2007) 7(1) QUT Law and Justice 
Journal 57. Given the ease with which state discrimination laws could be amended, I do not 
discuss in detail individual differences between them in terms of racial/ethnic/religious 
discrimination. 
102 This is of course similar to the wording of the Race Relations Act 1976 (UK) s 1(1A), 
implementing the European Directive 2000/43/EC.  
103 The reference here to ‘purpose or effect’ picks up the wording of the International 
Convention on the Elimination on all Kinds of Racial Discrimination, and is broader than the 
High Court of Australia’s current reading of s 116 of the Constitution, which requires a 
purpose of interfering with religious freedom. 
104 There are key differences between the Australian discrimination provision and similar 
provisions in the United Kingdom; 1) The Australian legislation does not require that the 
complainant suffer a ‘particular disadvantage’ as does the Race Relations Act 1976 (UK) s 
1(1A) and Equality Act 2010 (UK) s 19; 2) the Australian legislation does not allow 
discrimination to occur if it is a proportional means of achieving a legitimate end (by contrast 
with s 1(1A) of the Race Relations Act 1976 (UK) and s 19 of the Equality Act 2010 (UK)), 
and 3) the Australian Act does not distinguish between direct and indirect discrimination, as 
does the United Kingdom legislation. On the other hand, the scope of the Acts, being applied 
to race, colour, nationality, and ethnic or national origins, is similar. 
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ethnic group for the purposes of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)105 
and Race Relations Act 1976 (UK).106 It remains an open question in Australia 
whether followers of the Islamic faith constitute an ‘ethnic group’ within the 
meaning of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).107 The court considered 
the meaning of ‘ethnic group’ in Mandla v Dowell-Lee,108
In King-Ansell v Police, a New Zealand court found a group to be identifiable 
by its ethnic origin if it is a segment of the population distinguished from 
others by a sufficient combination of shared customs, beliefs, traditions and 
characteristics derived from a common or presumed common past, even if not 
drawn from common racial stock. The group would have a distinct social 
identity based not only on group cohesion and solidarity, but also beliefs as to 
their historical antecedents.
 identifying 
characteristics such as (a) shared history of which the group was conscious as 
distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which it keeps alive; 
and (b) a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and 
manners, often but not necessarily associated with religious observance.  
109
                                                 
105 Miller v Wertheim [2002] FCAFC 156 [14]; see also Jones v Scully (2002) 120 FCR 243, 
271–3; Silberberg v The Builders Collective of Australia Inc [2007] FCA 1512 [22]. In the 
Jones case, the court noted that Jews saw themselves as a distinct community bound by 
common customs and beliefs, with a common language and sharing common characteristics 
[112]. 
 Given this, it would be difficult to conclude 
106 R v Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15 (I have acknowledged above the key 
differences between the Australian and United Kingdom discrimination legislation regimes). 
107 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth) states an intention that 
the concept ‘ethnic origin’ be applied to those of the Muslim faith: Explanatory 
Memorandum, Racial Hatred Bill 1994 (Cth), 2–3; however, some United Kingdom decisions 
suggest that Islam is not an ‘ethnic origin’ because although Muslim people profess a 
common belief system, followers are divided across many nations, colours and languages: 
Tariq v Young (Unreported, Employment Appeals Tribunal 24773/88), Nyazi v Rymans 
Limited (Unreported, Employment Appeals Tribunal 6/88). The New South Wales Anti-
Discrimination Tribunal found that a Muslim follower did not have an ‘ethno-religious’ origin 
within that State’s discrimination laws (Khan v Commissioner, Department of Corrective 
Services [2002] NSWADT 131 [21]. But see State of Queensland v Mahommed (2007) EOC 
93-452 (Supreme Court of Queensland). Rachel Bloul criticises the distinctive treatment of 
Muslims here compared with, for example, the treatment of Jews and Sikhs, as ‘ridiculously 
unjust but perfectly legal’: ‘Anti-Discrimination Laws, Islamophobia and Ethnicization of 
Muslim Identities in Europe and Australia’ (2008) 28(1) Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 
7, 7. 
108 [1983] 2 AC 548, 569. The existence of a common geographical origin or descent from a 
smaller number of common ancestors, a common language, literature and religion, and the 
fact of being a minority or an oppressed or dominant group within a larger community also 
count (562). 
109 [1979] 2 NZLR 531, 543. Anthropological sources refer to self-perceived inclusion of those 
who hold in common a set of traditions not shared by others, often including religious beliefs 
and practices, language, a sense of historical continuity, and a common ancestry or place of 
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that followers of Islam were not an ethnic group within the meaning of the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The above sources emphasise a 
common sense of beliefs, values and customs, clearly evident in followers of 
Islam with the five pillars110 and various other accepted practices. Clear links 
between religion-based bonds and ethnicity have been acknowledged in the 
literature above. It has been noted by Islamic scholars that Judaism and Islam 
are alike in many ways in terms of being monotheistic religions,111 as well as 
ritual and practice regarding food, attitude to statues and religious images.112 
Given this fact, and the fact that precedent in both Australia and the United 
Kingdom confirms that Jews form an ethnic group, Muslims should not be 
excluded from the protection of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). 
Such legislation, being remedial in nature, should not be narrowly or 
pedantically applied. To do so would not be consistent with the purpose of the 
Act.113
Space does not allow a full airing of views here as to whether, if Muslim 
followers were an ‘ethnic group’ for the purposes of the RDA, a state law 
prohibiting the wearing of any face covering would be ‘inconsistent’ with the 
RDA in terms of section 109.
  
114
                                                                                                                    
origin: Lola Romanucci-Ross, George A De Vos and Takeyuki Tsada, Ethnic Identity 
(Rowman Altamira, 4th ed, 2006) 4–8.  
 The debate regarding whether the law must 
have a required purpose is easier here because the RDA specifically forbids a 
law with either a purpose or effect of discrimination based on ethnicity. If the 
law were cast as a ban on all face coverings, it might be argued the law does 
not breach section 9 of the RDA, because it does not distinguish between 
ethnicities, but applies to all. The argument might be that the effect of the law, 
while facially neutral, is that a Muslim cannot enjoy a right (expressed 
perhaps as a right to dress in accordance with their religion) enjoyed by 
person of other ethnicities (which ethnicity can be expressed through means 
110 These are: belief in God and that Muhammad is the messenger of God, prayer – Muslims 
must pray five times a day; fasting in the month of Ramadan; giving zakat or a percentage of 
one’s yearly accumulated wealth to the poor and needy; and pilgrimage to Mecca: Jamila 
Hussain, Islam: Its Law and Society (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2003) 14–15; David E 
Ingersoll, Richard K Matthews and Andrew Davison, The Philosophical Roots of Modern 
Ideology (Prentice Hall, 3rd ed, 2001) 254. Although there are different interpretations of 
Islamic principles, ‘there are several basic beliefs and values that hold the different Muslim 
interpretations of Islam together’ (257). 
111 It is conceded that Christianity is also monotheistic, yet a Christian would not be considered 
to belong to a particular ethnic group by virtue of that fact. 
112 Hussain, above n 109, 14. 
113 Of course, where there is ambiguity, a court should lean to an interpretation of legislation 
that is consistent with its purpose or object: s 15AB Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). At 
common law the mischief rule of statutory interpretation applies. 
114 I intend to explore the s 109 issues in this context in detail in a future article. 
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not involving the covering of the face, for argument’s sake the wearing of a 
yarmulke), and as such the requirement breaches section 10 of the RDA.  
VI CONCLUSION 
If the Commonwealth Government passed a law (otherwise constitutional) 
banning the wearing of religious dress or symbols, the High Court should read 
the principle of religious freedom in section 116 broadly. It should not 
validate a law just because the Commonwealth argues the law was passed for 
other (legitimate) purposes; in some cases, it is submitted courts in other 
jurisdictions have been too willing to accept at face value government 
arguments that bans on religious dress or symbols were necessary in pursuit of 
legitimate objectives of equality and neutrality, or that effects on religious 
freedoms were incidental (and so not considered to be objectionable). While 
the precise meaning of the wearing of items such as the hijab or burqa is open 
to interpretation, on at least some interpretations such wearing is supported by 
the Qur’an; it is highly contentious to extrapolate from the wearing of such 
items of clothing that oppression, subjugation or ‘extremism’ is being 
reflected. 
Such a ban might also infringe the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); for 
a Commonwealth law, this is not significant since the Commonwealth can 
amend its own legislation; in relation to a state law which purported to 
implement a ban, the court would have to consider directly whether Islam 
followers are an ‘ethnic group’ within the meaning of the Act; and then 
whether a blanket state ban on all face covering would be inconsistent with 
the RDA, in particular section 10. There is a strong argument that Muslim 
followers do comprise an ethnic group, and that section 10 might be used to 
invalidate a state attempt to ban face covering, given its effect on those of 
Muslim ‘ethnicity’, compared with other ethnicities.  
